

FUTURE WORK:

Jobs, self-employment and leisure after the industrial age

by

James Robertson

Section 1

This section contains the 2006 Preface, the Contents page, the Introduction and Part 1, including Chapters 1 to 4. Notes and references for the chapters in this section can be found at the end of this document.

Sections 2 and 3 containing all the other chapters can be downloaded from <http://www.jamesrobertson.com/books.htm>

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*Jobs, self-employment and leisure
after the industrial age*

JAMES ROBERTSON

Gower/Maurice Temple Smith

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Apart from the addition of the short 2006 Preface, the transfer of Chapter 1's Annex to the end of the chapter, and the omission of blank but notionally numbered pages (e.g. before and after the introductory pages to different Parts of the published 1985 text), the text here is virtually identical with the 1985 book.

James Robertson, February 2006.]

2006 Preface

1. The message of this book is that world society is in the early stage of a 'great transformation' of the kind that has occurred from time to time in history, affecting every aspect of human life. One of its outcomes could be a liberation of work, taking further the earlier progressions from slavery to serfdom, and then from serfdom to employment — all three of which have involved most people working for a minority superior to themselves. As that liberation takes place, more and more of us will work more freely under our own control than conventional employment has allowed. We will do what we see to be our own good, useful and rewarding work — for ourselves, other people and society as a whole. In *Future Work* I called it "ownwork".

2. Reading the book again has reminded me of the ferment of ideas about the future of work that was taking place in the early mid-1980s. How relevant are those ideas now? Have they been by-passed by the new economic orthodoxy of Thatcherism and Reaganism, by the collapse of state-based communism and socialism, and by the unstoppable 'progress' of globalised capitalism in the past twenty years?

The answer is No, they haven't been by-passed. Quite the reverse. The situation now is even more relevant to those ideas than when the book first came out.

3. Such 'progress' as there has been in the past twenty years has been destroying the ecosystems of our planet to a point where people all over the world now realise that the future of the human species and many other species is endangered. Globalised capitalism in its present form has been systematically widening the gap between rich and poor countries, and between rich and poor people in every country, to a point increasingly seen as intolerable and unsustainable. In international meetings many 'developing' countries have now begun to exert effective opposition to the clearly unjust system of international trading and finance that has been imposed on them by the Euro-American powers. Combined with the growing strength and economic power of countries like China and India and Brazil, this

is beginning to spell the end of the 500-year period of Euro-American world domination and leadership.

4. All this means that from now on, in one way or another, world development is going to take a new direction. This will bring changes to national economies in the kinds of work people do, the ways they work, and the way society organises work.

It has become clear already, in countries like Britain, that problems to do with employment and unemployment haven't gone away. The official unemployment figures may have gone down in the last twenty years, but the number of people now receiving disability benefits (instead of unemployment benefits) has gone up so much that the government has decided it is out of control. The number of people in employment has increased partly because both parents of young children have increasingly found it financially necessary for to get a job outside the home, and the government has positively compelled many single mothers to do so. So increasing numbers of young children are now being brought up in ways that may adversely affect their economic performance and social behaviour as adolescents and adults. Moreover, many of the new jobs created in the past twenty years are not pensionable. Indeed, in general the ability and readiness of employers to contribute to pensions for their employees is declining. The old 1945 assumption that most people will be able to rely on employment to provide them with a decent pension when they retire has to be questioned. The prospect is of a pensions crisis not many years ahead.

5. Those are some reasons why the prospect of a breakdown in the employment way of organising work is just as relevant now as twenty years ago. But more positive, forward-looking factors in favour of the *Future Work* approach must be mentioned too.

- a) Projects by the New Economics Foundation — <http://www.neweconomics.org> — and other similar organisations have been generating practical understanding and practical experience of that approach to the future of work at local level.
- b) Practical proposals have also now been worked out for a systematic reconstruction of the scoring system for the

- game of economic life at every level — which will, among its other beneficial outcomes, make it easier for people and localities to control their own economic lives. See, for example, <http://www.jamesrobertson.com/articles.htm>
- c) It has become common for politicians and commentators to voice concepts like '*social entrepreneur*' and '*enabling public policies*', which were originally floated in the 1970s and 1980s in books like *The Sane Alternative* and *Future Work*. The rhetoric still needs to be effectively backed with practice, but it suggests a greater readiness than existed twenty years ago to move in the new direction.

6. Re-reading *Future Work* recalled my excitement at some of the historical and philosophical, political and economic ideas I encountered while researching for it. I refer particularly to the chapters in Parts 2 and 3 on "Changing Perceptions of Work" and "The End of the Employment Empire" — and to topics like: how changes in the valuation of work have come hand in hand with new developments in the philosophy of economics; the parallels and contrasts between the medieval role of religion and the modern role of money; and the match between Kondratieff long waves in the economy and periodical realignments in political structure. These still seem to me to be relevant to the challenge of the future of work today.

7. Finally, I should say a word about the financing of a Citizen's Income. I referred to it in *Future Work* as a guaranteed basic income (GBI). The subject index shows several references to it. The most important passage is in pages 166-177. It foreshadows the conclusion I have come to now, but had not reached firmly then.

It is that a basic Citizen's Income should be one element in a larger reconstruction of the system of money and finance. It should replace an equivalent amount of existing public spending. It should be financed by new sources of public revenue which will replace an equivalent amount of existing taxes on incomes, value added and business profits. The new sources of public revenue will include taxes on common resources, such as the value of unimproved land and unextracted energy, along with new non-

tax revenue such as the profit from creating additions to another common resource — the national money supply.

The development of these proposals since 1985 can be traced in the following texts on this website.

- a) The 1994 discussion paper "Benefits and Taxes: A Radical Strategy" for the New Economics Foundation proposed a ten-year programme to introduce a Citizen's Income financed from taxing land values and energy instead of taxing incomes, profits and value added. See <http://www.jamesrobertson.com/toes-nef.htm>
- b) The 2000 book "Creating New Money: A Monetary Reform for the Information Age", written jointly with Joseph Huber for the New Economics Foundation, contains a thoroughly worked out proposal that money creation should be transferred from the commercial banks to an agency of the state, which would give it to the government to spend into circulation debt-free. <http://www.jamesrobertson.com/books.htm - creating>
- c) The December 2005 article on "The Future of Money: If We Want a Better Game of Economic Life, We'll Have to Change the Scoring System" — in the journal "Soundings" (issue 31) — included monetary reform, land value taxation and a Citizen's Income, as systemically related institutional changes for a new political economy, based on fairly sharing the value of common resources
<http://www.jamesrobertson.com/articles.htm>

James Robertson, February 2006

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Introduction

In Britain today several million people are unemployed. In the industrialised countries as a whole the number runs into tens of millions. For third world countries the situation is even worse. In 1982 the International Labour Organisation (ILO) estimated that a thousand million new jobs would have to be created by the year 2000 in order to achieve full employment worldwide. The Director-General of the ILO commented at the time: "It has to be fully understood that there will be no situation of full employment if we are speaking of conventional employment."^{1*} Things have got worse, not better, since then.

Most conventional politicians and economists still seem to claim, though with diminishing assurance, that their particular policies will bring back full employment in the long run. But, year by year, more and more people see these claims as utopian wishful thinking, if not downright deception. The impact of labour-saving technology, the competitive pressures of international trade, and the reluctance of taxpayers to finance more public service jobs, clearly suggest that, if substantial economic growth ever does come back as we still understand it, much of it is likely to be jobless growth. More and more people now feel in their bones, not only that many years of high unemployment lie ahead, but that full employment will never return again. They yearn for realistic and responsible leaders who will admit this possibility, and be prepared to respond to the new situation it implies.

The appropriate responses must be both practical and visionary. Practical action is needed urgently to ease the problems of the millions of people who face the prospect of unemployment now. Any society which continues to propagate the job ethic and to

*** Notes and References are as in 1985. Download Section 3 of the book.**

link basic incomes with jobs, but which leaves millions of people jobless, will continue to inflict great damage on those people and on itself. But, to be effective, practical action will also have to be visionary. The measures taken to alleviate the immediate problems of unemployment now will have to provide stepping-stones — and be seen to provide stepping-stones — to new ways of organising work, different from conventional employment, for the future.

As I shall show, there are three positive views about the future of work, leaving aside the purely pessimistic view that the present unemployment crisis will lead to disaster or continuing decline. The first is that something like full employment will return, and that employment will remain the normal and dominant way of organising work. The second is that full employment will not return, and that we have now begun the transition to a leisure society in which leisure will replace jobs as the central life activity for increasing numbers of people. The third is that full employment will not return, but that for increasing numbers of people it will be replaced by self-organised work, or 'ownwork'.

Ownwork means activity which is purposeful and important, and which people organise and control for themselves. It may be either paid or unpaid. It is done by people as individuals and as household members; it is done by groups of people working together; and it is done by people, who live in a particular locality, working locally to meet local needs. For the individual and the household, ownwork may mean self-employment, essential household and family activities, productive leisure activities such as do-it-yourself or growing some of one's own food, and participation in voluntary work. For groups of people, ownwork may mean working together as partners, perhaps in a community enterprise or a cooperative, or in a multitude of other activities with social, economic, environmental, scientific or other purposes in which they have a personal interest and to which they attach personal importance. For localities, the significance of ownwork is that it contributes to local self-reliance, an increased local capacity to meet local needs by local work, and a reduction of dependence on outside employers and suppliers.

The actual future will, of course, contain employment, leisure and ownwork — all three. There will almost certainly still be conventional jobs for many people; there will almost certainly be some increase in leisure, perhaps for most people; and ownwork will almost certainly play a larger part in many people's lives and in the life of society as a whole.

But it will be the third of these — the expansion of ownwork — that provides the key to the future of work and leisure. Only the expansion of ownwork will create conditions in which the problems of employment and leisure will be satisfactorily resolved. Only the expansion of ownwork will reflect the shift of values underlying the transition to a post-industrial future which has now begun. Only the expansion of ownwork can bring about the next stage in the liberation of work foreshadowed by the earlier historical progression from slavery to serfdom, and then from serfdom to employment.

That is the theme of this book. The book is directly concerned with the future of work in today's industrialised countries. But the same theme is powerfully relevant to the future of third world countries too. First, as ownwork plays an increasing part in the economics of the rich countries, those countries will become less exploitative of third world economies. Second, the principle of ownwork underlies the prospect of a new path of self-reliant economic development — 'another development'² — no less for the poor countries than for the rich. Third, in so far as people in the poor countries still look to the rich for the model of development to follow, the expansion of ownwork in the industrialised countries will support those in the third world who are trying to lead their countries along a more self-reliant path.

Part 1 of the book explores the three possible futures for work, and assesses how realistic each is. It reviews the key features of work during the employment age, and suggests that these will need to be fundamentally changed as part of the transition to a new work order for a post-industrial society. It gives a broad impression of what a shift of emphasis from employment to ownwork will imply, for example for energy, technology, the environment, leisure, education and training, money incomes,

investment, and access to capital and land.

Part 2 examines how people's perceptions of work have changed in the past, especially in the transition from the middle ages to the modern period culminating in the industrial age. It discusses how the Protestant work ethic evolved, and what pointers this gives us now to the possible emergence of a new work ethic, based on ownwork, for the post-industrial age. It relates the rise of the Protestant work ethic to the change in worldview and values that marked the end of the middle ages and the beginning of the modern period; and it suggests that a comparable change in worldview and values is taking place today which will help to shape the new work ethic now. It considers the changes that have taken place in our ways of evaluating work, as an aspect of the development of economic theory, and suggests that further changes in economic thinking will accompany the shift from employment to ownwork.

Part 3 shows that the power structures of late industrial society have been shaped by the fact that employment has been the dominant form of work. It suggests, in particular, that today's organised labour movement, financial system, and system of representative politics and bureaucratic government can all be seen as superstructures arising out of the employment way of organising work; or, to put the same thing another way, that they are interlocking parts of an employment empire which has made the people of industrialised countries more and more dependent on it. The shift from employment to ownwork will erode the foundations of these superstructures, at least to some extent. In a sense, it will mark the end of the employment empire. In this end-of-empire process, many people now dependent on employment will face the challenge of liberating themselves from this dependence; and many people working within the existing power structures will be called on to decolonise them and to manage their decline constructively.

Part 4 fills out some of the detail of this approach. It deals with the practicalities of the shift to ownwork. It first shows that in many particulars this shift may already be under way and accelerating in the last few years. It then outlines an ownwork agenda, and examines how some of the changes proposed may

be taken up by, and may affect, various sections of society — individual people, localities, businesses, government agencies and other professions and institutions. At the same time, Part 4 makes clear that no one should expect — or wait for — the ownwork agenda, and the shift from employment to ownwork, to be carried out according to any coherent or systematic plan. No government, for example, can realistically be expected to make the ownwork agenda a basis for its policy programme, until it has become clear to everyone that the shift towards ownwork is already far advanced. For the most part, the ownwork agenda will be carried out by the piecemeal interaction of initiatives and responses, the initiatives coming mainly from a wide diversity of individuals and unofficial groups, and the responses coming from the established institutions of society.

There is one further point to be made by way of introduction. I am sometimes asked what a society based on ownwork rather than on employment will be like and how it will function. Many detailed aspects of the answer to this question will be found in the chapters which follow. For example I see the move towards ownwork as a move towards a more self-reliant society, more decentralised, more equal as between men and women, better equipped with effective small-scale technologies, more committed to a high quality of life, and so on. But, in a more general sense, I believe the question itself is misleading. I have never thought it realistic to try to lay down a blueprint for a future society. For one thing, whatever may have happened in the past, I don't think a static society is likely to exist in the future. For another, I am more concerned with what is to be done now, than with the precise detail of what things may be like at some future date.

Rather than lay down a blueprint for an ownwork society, then, my purpose in this book is to convey a clear impression of the change of direction in the development of work that is needed now, as we step forward on the next stage of our journey from the past into the present and on into the future. We are coming to the end of the employment stage. We have reached the limit of progress in that direction. Two ways forward present themselves — the leisure route and the ownwork route. My

aims are the comparatively limited, but practical, ones: of explaining why the ownwork route is the one we should take; of giving a reasonably clear idea of what is likely to be involved in setting out upon this new path now; and of providing material for discussion and further exploration towards that end (see Appendix 2 for a checklist of relevant questions).

In the last few years I have read many books, articles and papers about the future of work. I have taken part in numerous conferences and meetings on the subject, in North America, Australia, Scandinavia, and other parts of Europe, as well as in this country. These have been organised by businesses and business schools, government agencies, universities, professional organisations, religious bodies, and many different kinds of local groups. All over the industrialised world people are now asking what comes after full employment, and are beginning to confront the possibilities for change. I have learnt much from many of them.³

It would be impossible for me to acknowledge my debt to all who, in these and in other ways, have contributed to my thinking. Many are mentioned in the Notes and References at the end. Many others were mentioned in my last book.⁴ But my main debt of gratitude, once again, is to my wife, Alison Pritchard. She has worked with me throughout. Her contribution has been indispensable.

PART 1

WHAT COMES AFTER THE EMPLOYMENT AGE?

In Part 1 we explore three possible futures for work, and assess how realistic each is. We review the key features of work during the employment age, and suggest that these will need to be fundamentally changed as part of the transition to a new work order for a post-industrial society. We give a broad impression of what a shift of emphasis from employment to ownwork will imply, for example for energy, technology, the environment, leisure, education and training, money incomes, investment, and access to capital and land.

1

Possible Futures For Work

A Post-Industrial Age?

At times of uncertainty like the present, different people perceive the future in different ways. There are at least three distinct views about the future of work. The keyword for the first is employment. The keyword for the second is leisure. The keyword for the third is ownwork. They are based on three distinct perceptions of the future of industrialised society. I call these Business As Usual, HE (Hyper-Expansionist) and SHE (Sane, Humane, Ecological). Business As Usual assumes that the society of the future will not be very different from late industrial society as it is today. HE and SHE are contrasting visions of a post-industrial society which, in either case, will be distinctly different from the society we have today.

Some people dislike the term 'post-industrial'. They find it an ugly, woolly word that tells us nothing about the future. They say it is no more informative than if we called the great transformation of the 18th and 19th centuries the 'post-agricultural' revolution, and the age which it brought in the 'post-agricultural' age. And they point out that industry will continue to exist for the foreseeable future.

However, the idea of a post-industrial future does suggest that we are coming to the end of the period of history which we call the industrial age, and that a new age is beginning. It helps to prepare us for the possibility of a post-industrial transformation of society no less fundamental than the industrial revolution brought in. It prompts such questions as: what will post-industrial society be like? And what do we want it to be like?

As a matter of historical fact, the term 'industrial revolution' did not come into use until long after the main events to which it refers, by which time the defining characteristic of post-agricultural society had become clear. We do not yet know what

the most apt description of the post-industrial age will be. Those who now try to describe it as the Space Age, or the Age of Aquarius, or the Communication Age, or the Information Age, or the Age of Automation, or whatever, are usually doing no more than emphasising the aspect of the post-industrial era which particularly interests them.

So far as industry is concerned, of course it will not cease to exist in the post-industrial age, any more than farms and churches ceased to exist when the industrial age came in. The point is that, just as the dominant features of industrial society were quite different from those of the agricultural and religious society which it succeeded, so the dominant values, lifestyles, practices, institutions and modes of thought in a post-industrial society will be different from those that have been dominant in the industrial age.

Two Visions of Post-Industrial Society¹

One vision of post-industrial society — the 'HE' vision of the future — might more accurately be described as superindustrial. It is a vision of a future based on big science, big technology and expert know-how. Its dominant drives and features would be those of industrial society accentuated and writ large. One of its most prominent exponents, the futurist Herman Kahn, used to say that we are now only half way through the period of expansion and growth that has been typical of the industrial age. We have had 200 years of it, and there is another 200 years to go.

By contrast, the 'SHE' vision of the future foresees, not an acceleration along the same path of development we have followed during the industrial age, but a change in the direction of development. According to this view, the industrial revolution marked a huge advance in the capacity of human beings to control and harness the material world. It vastly extended the technical limits to human achievement, and amplified our physical capabilities — to travel, to communicate, to build, to provide ourselves with heat and power and light, to produce all manner of goods and commodities, and to organise ourselves in millions for peace and war. Today it has brought about changes

in the institutions of society and in people's personal lives that few people living 200 years ago could possibly have foreseen, or even imagined. So, as the industrial age comes to an end, a comparable transformation may be in prospect — a post-industrial revolution which could bring about an advance no less far-reaching than the industrial revolution did. This time, however, the breakthrough will be primarily psychological and social, not technical and economic. It will enlarge the human limits to human achievement. It will amplify our capacity to develop ourselves as human beings, together with the communities and the societies in which we live. Not only will it bring fundamental social and personal change, as the industrial revolution did, but that is what will be its main motive force.

These two contrasting visions of post-industrial society have emerged quite clearly in the last few years. Some of their main values and tendencies are shown in these two columns.

HE	SHE
quantitative values and goals	qualitative values and goals
economic growth	human development
organisational values and goals	personal and inter-personal values and goals
money values	real needs and aspirations
contractual relationships	mutual exchange relationships
intellectual, rational, detached	intuitive, experiential, empathetic
masculine priorities	feminine priorities
specialisation/helplessness	all-round competence
technocracy/dependency	self-reliance
centralising	local
urban	country-wide
European	planetary
anthropocentric	ecological

These two visions of a post-industrial future provide the two poles, and the two clusters of ideas and possibilities, around which serious discussion of the future, including the future of work, is likely to revolve from now on. The Annex to this Chapter outlines some of the practical differences between them and 'Business As Usual'.

Three Futures For Work

The Business-As-Usual view of the future of work is still voiced, though with diminishing conviction, by politicians and economists of all mainstream persuasions, and by most business leaders and trade union leaders, in all the industrial countries. They do not question, at least not in public, that employment will remain the dominant form of work and that full employment ought to be restored. They suggest that it can be restored if the particular policies which they support are adopted. For some this means bringing back high levels of employment in conventional manufacturing industry. For others it means replacing jobs lost in manufacturing by a great increase of jobs elsewhere: in information services like computing and telecommunications; in sectors of the knowledge industry like research and consultancy; in social services like education and health; and in leisure industries and services like sports, entertainment, and travel. Some hope that, by making the economy internationally competitive, the resulting creation of wealth will automatically generate enough jobs for all. Micawberlike, they ask us to have faith that new jobs will turn up, though they cannot tell us what these jobs will be or how they will be created. Others, by contrast, hope that by insulating the national economy from international competition and by planning it centrally, they will be able to organise enough jobs for all.

Because we have become so accustomed to these various expressions of the Business-As-Usual view, we have tended to forget how much they take for granted and, until quite recently, we have often failed to notice how large an element of utopian wishful thinking they contain.

The HE view of the future of work appeals to many scientists, technologists, industrialists and business commentators who, as most people do, see the future primarily from their own point of view. They expect the existing polarisation between skilled and unskilled workers, employed and unemployed, to continue to the point where all the important work is done by a minority of highly skilled and highly responsible people. These people will be putting the space colonies into orbit, installing and monitoring the automated factories, managing the nuclear power stations, running the psychiatric institutes and genetic laboratories,

operating the communications networks, and carrying out all the other highly skilled tasks on which a super-industrial society will depend. The rest of us will be living lives of leisure. As in past societies, the prevailing pattern of work in the HE future will reflect a division between superior and inferior members of society. But the division will no longer be between masters and slaves, lords and serfs, employers and employees. This time it will be between workers and drones. The working minority will monopolise all the important work and exclude the rest of the population from it — at best permitting them to undertake marginal, menial tasks.

Because we have become accustomed to accept the authority, in their own specialist fields, of those who support the HE view of the future of work, we have sometimes tended to forget the political, social and psychological realities which it ignores, and have failed to notice how large an element of utopian, 'mad scientist' fantasy it contains.

The SHE view of the future of work, by contrast, sees the historical progression from masters-and-slaves to lords-and-serfs and then to employers-and-employees as an unfinished progress towards greater equality. It now envisages a further step in that direction. As hopes of restoring full employment fade away, the dominant form of work will no longer be seen as employment but as self-organised activity. In other words, many more people will take control of their own work. They will work on their own account, to meet their own needs, to achieve their own purposes, in their own households and local communities, on a personal and inter-personal basis, to a very much greater extent than the prevailing pattern of work in the industrial age has allowed them to do. The direction in which work will develop in the SHE future will represent a reversal of some of the dominant trends of the industrial age. Thus, as we shall see, the informal economy* will become one of the main areas for further economic growth and social progress. A fulfilling, well-balanced life will be regarded as

* In principle, I use the term 'informal economy' to include activities in which people do things for themselves and one another without being paid, as contrasted with the 'formal economy' in which work takes the form of paid employment. In practice, the distinction is often blurred. For a fuller discussion, see Chapter 7.

one that offers a flexible choice of work patterns; and part-time work in the formal economy and part-time work in the informal economy will come to be seen as the norm. Ownwork will be the characteristic form of work in the new work order.

Because the majority of people in late industrial societies have perceived themselves as dependent employees and consumers, and because powerful interest groups of all kinds have done everything they could to reinforce that perception of social reality, it has been easy to dismiss as a romantic, utopian dream the idea of a new work order based on ownwork. It is only in the last few years that this idea has begun to be realistically appraised, as a practical response to the worsening prospects for conventional employment.²

Three Possible Futures

Work

BUSINESS AS USUAL

Full employment can be restored and employment will remain the dominant form of work. Other activities (e.g. housework, family care, voluntary work) will continue to have lower status. Sharp distinctions will continue to exist between education for the young, work for adults, and retirement for the old; and between work and leisure.

HE

Full employment will not be restored. All necessary work will be done by a skilled elite of professionals and experts, backed by automation, other capital-intensive technology, and specialist know-how. Others will not work. They will merely consume the goods and services provided by the working minority - including leisure, information and education services. Society will be split between workers and drones.

SHE

Full employment will not be restored. Work will be redefined to include many forms of useful and valued activity in addition to paid employment. Paid and unpaid work will be shared around more equally, e.g. between men and women. Part-time employment will be common. Many different patterns of working will be possible, according to people's circumstances and preferences. Households and neighbourhoods will become recognised workplaces and centres of production. Young and old will have valued work roles. Working and Leisure activities will overlap.

Money Incomes	BUSINESS AS USUAL	HE	SHE
	Paid work will continue to be the primary source. Society will continue to provide a basic income to people who fall outside this norm, but such people, if of 'working age' will continue to be stigmatised as exceptions.	The skilled working elite will be highly paid. Proponents of this scenario have not yet worked out through what channels everyone else will receive an income. From dividends, after nationalisation of all production? Or from benefits financed by high taxation? Or as wages from menial jobs?	Society will pay everyone a basic income as of right, enabling them to choose how they will divide their time between paid and unpaid activities. People who do not need this earned income because they can earn more on top of it will have it taxed back automatically.
Technology	New technologies will continue to be developed for their own sake, because scientists and design engineers find them challenging and because scientists and design engineers find them challenging and because industries and governments hope they will prove profitable and that people can be persuaded to use them. There will also continue to be opposition to many new technologies on the grounds that they may be dangerous, exploitative, wasteful, polluting and socially undesirable or unnecessary.	Even more effort and resources than at present will be channelled into the development of new technologies. It will be accepted that all problems have technical solutions, and that top priority should always be given to the technical approach, including the development of new forms of expertise and reliance on the decisions and advice of experts. Opposition to this approach will become weaker. Technology will be master.	The development and diffusion of certain types of new technologies and skills will have high priority. These will be technologies and skills which enhance the capacities of people to do more for themselves and one another, and reduce their dependence on outside systems, organisations and professional expertise. In particular, small-scale (including micro-processor) technologies will greatly expand people's capacities to work for themselves and one another within their own homes and localities. This scenario is not anti-technology. Technology will have an important role, but as servant.

Economy

BUSINESS AS USUAL

Economic Growth can be restored. Creation of wealth by industry and commercial services can continue to support publicly financed social services. Industrialised economies will remain centralised, and big business and publicly owned corporations will retain their dominant role. Formal economic activity will continue to be the only kind of economic activity that really matters, and informal economic activity will remain unimportant.

HE

Economic Growth will only be achieved by concentrating on high technology production and by marketing highly professionalised services. The wealth thereby created will meet society's needs. Formal economic activity will become even more dominant. Multinational business will have an even more dominant role.

SHE

The most important areas for economic growth and social progress will be in the informal economy. People's energies will be released to create wealth and welfare for themselves and one another in their own households, neighbourhoods and localities. The fact of so many people finding satisfactory occupation in this way will remove many existing obstacles to the efficient functioning of the formal economy. Within the formal economy, local small-scale enterprise will be the main growth sector. Localities will become more self-sufficient economically and less dependent on outside employers.

<p>Planning and Housing</p>	<p>BUSINESS AS USUAL Urban industrialised patterns of lifestyle, employment and movement will remain the norm. Residential and work locations will remain in separate zones. Planning regulations will continue to assume that people use their homes for leisure and consumption activities only. Houses will continue to be designed that way. The land, premises and equipment that people need for their work will continue to be provided by employers.</p>	<p>HE The coming of the leisure society and the information age will help to reshape the built environment. people will have more leisure time to spend at home, at local leisure facilities (swimming pools, sports centres, etc), and on trips away from home. The provision of new leisure facilities (including education) will make big new demands on space. What precisely this will mean, for example in old inner city areas, is not yet clear.</p>	<p>HE As more of people's work, leisure, learning and caring activities centre on their homes, neighbourhoods and localities, new demands for space and facilities will arise there. Today's house designs, zoning arrangements, and planning regulations will become inappropriate. More people will participate in planning and building their own houses and environment. There will be more shared, multi-family households and clusters of houses, including housing co-operatives. More people will need land, premises and equipment for their own work. Residential densities will fall, in the old city centres as elsewhere, and the tendency will be toward more dispersed patterns of settlement countrywide.</p>
	<p>Transport</p>	<p>Traffic and transport patterns will continue much as they are today.</p>	<p>A decline in travel between homes and places of work will be matched by a rise in travel for leisure.</p>

Energy	<p>BUSINESS AS USUAL Patterns of energy use and energy development will continue much as at present. Changes will mainly be prompted by adjustment to price changes and the balance of supply and demand.</p>	<p>HE Demand for energy will continue to grow. Dependence on capital-intensive, centralised, high technology sources of energy (e.g. nuclear power) will grow. A few centres of energy production will supply the whole populace of energy consumers. A 'hard' energy path will be followed.³</p>	<p>SHE Less energy-intensive patterns of working, living and transport, coupled with conservation and more efficient ways of using energy, will reduce demand for energy. Energy production will be more decentralised. There will be a tendency to greater energy self-sufficiency in regions and localities - and even, to some extent, in households where energy conservation, heat pumps, solar panels, etc, will reduce the need for energy brought in from outside. A 'soft' energy path will be followed.³</p>
Food	<p>Patterns of food production, processing, distribution and consumption will continue to be dominated by agribusiness farming, industrial manufacturing and the distribution of processed and package foods through supermarket chains to standardised consumers.</p>	<p>As for Business As Usual, but with more emphasis on new agricultural and nutrition technology. For example, more productive strains of animals and crops will be developed; beneficial elements (e.g. vitamins) will be added and harmful ones (e.g. fats) will be removed as a normal aspect of food-manufacturing and processing. People will eat out more often; fast-food chains will be part of a food service industry expanding in response to the growing 'leisure market'.</p>	<p>There will be, as for energy, a tendency for greater food self-sufficiency. More people will grow food, either as small farmers, part-time farmers and smallholders, or (for themselves) in their own gardens and allotments. Food production will be more decentralised and food distribution chains will be shorter. Food cooperatives will become more numerous. Home cooking will be the norm. Multi-family purchasing and feeding arrangements may become more common.</p>

**Education
and
Learning****BUSINESS AS USUAL**

As at present, education will take place in educational institutions at the hands of professional educators. It will continue to be primarily for young people, before they enter the age bracket in which they will be expected to have a full-time job. Its main aims will be to provide them with the credentials to get and hold down a job, and to socialise them into what will remain a mass-employment, mass-consumption society. Main criteria of a good education will continue to be the certificates and diplomas that one can show for it, and the jobs which it opens up.

HE

Education will divide into two main branches. The first will qualify a person for a high status job as a member of the technocratic and professional elite. The second branch will teach people how to use their leisure. Its status will be somewhat lower. Both types of education will, in principle, be life-long. In the high technology, leisure society of the information age, education will be one of the biggest growth industries. Openings for professionally qualified, expert educators will greatly expand.

SHE

Education will be for capability. It will help people to learn life-skills of all kinds - physical, intellectual, inter-personal, emotional. It will be geared to a pattern of living in which most people expect to have part-time employment and also to undertake a good deal of useful, rewarding activity for themselves and their family and neighbours. It will recognise that people often learn better from doing things with experienced people than receiving class-room instruction from professional educators.

Health**BUSINESS AS USUAL**

Individuals and society will continue to give lower priority to the promotion of health than to the treatment of sickness. 'Health services' will continue to be primarily sickness services, and people's perception of themselves as consumers of those services will continue to dominate their perception of health. The main debate will continue to be whether sickness services should be provided commercially or at public expense.

HE

Medical technology will solve most health problems. Genetic screening, organ transplants, new drugs, computer monitoring and computer records will eliminate or control congenital diseases and handicaps, enable the body to be maintained in good operating order, and enable expert physicians to deal more quickly and effectively than today with their patients' problems - a widening range of which, such as bereavements, losses and failures, will become subject to medical treatment. Health promotion and sickness prevention may increase somewhat. But the increased dominance of medical experts and technologists will ensure that today's remedial bias remains strong.

SHE

Greater personal responsibility for health will lead people to the positive cultivation of their health and to the positive promotion of a healthy physical and social environment. Higher priority will be given to nutrition, public health and the psychosomatic aspects of health than is given today. Personal self-help and cooperative mutual aid in matters of health and sickness will be more highly rated than dependence on the expertise of health professionals. People will learn to manage the health hazards and stressful transitions in their lives. Nurture and care will be emphasised in contrast to the 'heroic' interventionism of the HE future.

Principles	BUSINESS AS USUAL	HE	SHE
	Mass employment and mass consumption. Dependence on institutions for work and for goods and services. Obligation to be employed. Organisational values, masculine values, anthropocentric values. Interventionist and instrumental mode of action. Analytical and reductionist mode of thought.	Mass leisure and mass consumption. Continued dependence on institutions. Increased dependence on technology and experts. A schizophrenic society: the working elite will be hard-working, responsible, and highly motivated; the masses will enjoy leisured irresponsibility. Technocratic values dominant. Even greater emphasis on organisational, masculine, anthropocentric values, etc.	A shift towards self-help and decentralisation in production of goods and provision of services. Reintegration of peoples' work with other aspects of their lives. This will bring new meaning to lives. Personal values, feminine values, ecological values. Experiential mode of action. Intuitive mode of awareness.

2

A Realistic Assessment

If we ask which of our three futures — Business As Usual, HE and SHE — the actual future of work is most likely to resemble, the realistic answer must be that it is almost certain to contain elements of all three. To some extent, work will continue to be organised as jobs and money incomes will continue to be linked with employment. To some extent there will continue to be a widening gap between the activities of the more highly skilled members of society and their less highly skilled fellow citizens, a general increase in leisure, and a weakening of the link between employment and income. And to some extent there will be a revival of local economies, a growth of self-organised work, and a blurring of work and leisure. A realistic approach to the future of work and the problems of unemployment must therefore encompass all three views of the future. Public policies should do so, business strategies should do so, and so should people's plans and thoughts about their own working lives.

However, if we ask which of the three visions opens up the most helpful new insights from a practical point of view, we find that a great deal of weight must be given to the prospect of ownwork and the she future.

The Four-Sector Economy

One useful way of looking at it is to divide the economy into four sectors, and to consider the future prospects for work in each.¹ The first sector contains big industry - the capital-intensive, highly mechanised activities of extraction and production such as mining, oil, chemicals, heavy engineering, steel, ship-building, motor-manufacturing, and so on. The second sector contains big services - the hitherto more labour-intensive commercial service activities like banking and insurance, and public services like education, health and welfare. The third sector contains small local enterprises, including conventional, small profit-making businesses, but also including a growing

range of community businesses, community associations, residents' associations, local voluntary activities, amenity projects and other new kinds of local enterprise. The fourth sector is the household and neighbourhood sector, consisting of conventional forms of home-based paid work including self-employment, and conventional forms of unpaid work like housework, but also including a growing range of activities that provide goods and services directly for oneself, one's family and one's neighbours, such as food growing, home improvement, the servicing and repair of vehicles and equipment, and many forms of self-provided entertainment and care.

There is general agreement that, in the big industrial sector, job losses will almost certainly continue to outweigh the creation of new jobs. This sector has to compete internationally, and its costs must be competitive with those in other countries - not only the mature industrial countries of Western Europe and North America, but also the newly industrialised nations, especially of the Far East, whose labour costs are still comparatively low. This will mean using the most efficient and advanced technologies, including automation and the microprocessor. And that will mean shedding more jobs. In fact, the big industrial sector is in a Catch-22 situation, so far as the future of jobs is concerned. Either these industries will be modernised successfully enough for them to be internationally competitive, which will involve reducing jobs. Or they will not be modernised successfully, they will become uncompetitive, and they will then have to be further slimmed down with the loss of many jobs. Either way, the realistic assumption must be that the big industrial sector will offer fewer jobs in the future than it does today.

In the big services sector, the last two decades have seen more jobs being created in banking, insurance and other financial and commercial services. But this is unlikely to last. Office automation will lead to substantial reductions in staff. Restructuring in the financial services industry, such as is now taking place in the City of London where the old demarcation lines between building societies, banks, the stock exchange, and so on are breaking down, may have a similar effect. If there should be a financial collapse, or an end to the long-term expansion of financial institutions and the long-term growth in

the role played by money in our lives (see Chapter 9), this too would reduce the number of jobs in financial and commercial services.

The question is whether these prospective job losses in financial and commercial services will be offset or even, as has been claimed, more than offset by new jobs in information and communication industries like computers and cable television, in leisure industries, and in public services like education, health and welfare.

Tom Stonier² is one of those who argue that "the major problem confronting western governments in the 1980s is the need to devise ways of effecting a smooth transition from an industrial to an information economy - to shift labour from the manufacturing to the knowledge industries. In part the answer has to involve a massive expansion of an updated education system to provide new, mainly information skills which will be useful in a post-industrial economy". Stonier will not be surprised if "the education industry becomes the number one employer over the next few decades".

However, it is almost certainly naive to assume that in 30 years' time millions more of us than today will be employed in the kinds of jobs that produce information and education. There will be a limit to the amount of information that people will be prepared to buy. And, as we have seen in the last ten years in all the industrialised countries, including countries like France and Sweden and Britain and Germany that have had socialist or social democratic governments, the prospect of financing a massive expansion of employment in services like education and health is very slim. Some people say it would be possible to find the money for a huge expansion of jobs in these services if the will to do so existed. But this misses the underlying reality. This is that employment is now becoming an uneconomic way to organise many kinds of work. The nature of the employment relationship is now making it increasingly difficult to get work done by employees on terms, and to a standard of performance, which are acceptable both to them and to the other parties concerned. We shall return to this point later in this chapter.

At all events, it is little more than wishful thinking to suppose that enough new jobs will be created in the big services sector to offset job losses elsewhere in the economy. It would be very unwise to assume that full employment will eventually be restored that way. It is more realistic to expect a declining, or at best a stationary, level of jobs in the large-scale services sector.

This leaves us with the local enterprise sector and the household and neighbourhood sector. The declining number of jobs in the two big sectors of the economy, big industry and big services, means that more people will be spending more time in the local and household sectors. The amount of work done in these two sectors will certainly expand. But, although some of this will be in the form of conventional jobs, much of the new work will not take the form of regular, conventional employment, but rather it will be casual, and much of it either unpaid or semi-voluntary.

As we shall see, the prospect of a very substantial expansion of useful activity in localities, neighbourhoods and households is of central importance. Not only does it provide the key to a hopeful, indeed a better, future for work, it also offers hope for dealing with many of the other economic and social problems that late industrial societies now face. But before going further into that aspect we should thoroughly satisfy ourselves that a great increase in ownwork is, in fact, unavoidable; and that no acceptable outcome from the present unemployment crisis will be achieved merely by creating new jobs, or by expanding leisure, or by some mixture of the two.

Restoring Full Employment — A Realistic Goal?

Apart from the hope that jobs lost in the industrial sector will be replaced by new jobs created in the services and information sector, the arguments put forward by those who still say they think employment will remain the normal form of work and that jobs can be made available for all who want them, are broadly of three kinds. They rely on the possibility of economic recovery in the short term; on the possibility of economic recovery in the long term; or on a continuing reduction in the time worked by employees.

The possibility of recovery in the short term can be quickly disposed of. Few people now seriously believe that short-term economic recovery could restore full employment. Politicians may continue to claim that employment will pick up as the recession comes to an end, and that their particular policies will help to make this happen. But many people now understand that, if significant economic growth does take place in the next three or four years, much of it will be jobless. There are not many who see a realistic alternative to continuing high unemployment for some years to come.³

The possibility that full employment might eventually be restored by a new burst of economic growth in the longer term is based on the theory of long waves, or 'Kondratieff cycles', named after the Russian economist who worked them out and who died in one of Stalin's Siberian camps in the 1930s.⁴ Kondratieff showed that, since the industrial age began, there has been a recurring pattern of economic prosperity and decline. The first long wave began to rise in the 1780s, peaked around 1810 and sank back into deep depression by about 1840. Beginning from that point the second long wave rose to its peak in the 1860s and fell back to its trough in the 1890s. The third long wave peaked about 1920 and fell back into the deep depression of the early and middle 1930s. A fourth long wave peaked around 1970. It can be expected to continue falling until it hits bottom some time in the early 1990s. At that point, assuming the long-wave cycles continue to repeat, the fifth long wave will start to rise. We might expect to get back to full employment some time around the year 2000.

The Kondratieff cycles of the industrial age have been associated with marked bursts of technological innovation. For example, the huge explosion of railway building in Britain after 1840 coincided with the upswing of the second long wave; the rise of the internal combustion engine and electricity were associated with the third; and so on. The theory is that the introduction of new technologies triggers the new long wave; then, as the wave proceeds, effort shifts to diffusing those technologies more and more widely through the economy, and for a time further technological invention and innovation slows down. In due course the time comes when the diffusion of that

wave of new technologies can go no further; the downswing then begins. Eventually, the whole process starts again with a new burst of technological innovation.

The argument, then, is that if we wait for another 15 years and if the fifth Kondratieff cycle proceeds according to expectation, we may eventually get back to something like full employment. We have the prospect of 15 more difficult years immediately ahead, but, so the argument goes, that is no reason for casting aside the assumption that full employment will eventually be restored and that employment will continue to be the dominant form of work.

But think again about this. Can we wait another 15 years? Shall we be able to leave it, as in the past, to the cycle of technological innovation and change eventually to restore the conditions for full employment? May not social forces compel us to legitimate new ways of organising work and new ways of providing people with their money incomes, before another 15 years of high unemployment have passed? Unless, long before that time, some way is found of relieving the damaging effects of unemployment on people's income, social status and personal self-respect, the society of the late 1980s and 1990s is unlikely to be prepared to endure continuing high unemployment as peaceably as did the society that existed in the previous down waves of 50, 90, 140 and 200 years ago.

And what if the industrial age is coming to an end? We cannot necessarily assume that the long-wave pattern of prosperity and slump, together with its effects on employment, that has prevailed during the industrial age will prove a reliable guide for the post-industrial future. As I have suggested, we may well have now reached a stage of economic and social development in which employment is becoming an increasingly difficult way to organise many kinds of work on terms acceptable to all the parties concerned. These include principally employees, employers, customers and (where public services are concerned) taxpayers. The increasing difficulty of organising work in the form of employment has presented itself most clearly as disagreements about pay and money: employees are only willing to work for rising levels of pay which employers, customers and

taxpayers feel they can less and less afford. (Attempts to dodge these disagreements have been a principal cause of inflation in recent decades.) These financial difficulties are reinforced by features of employment that are absent from other forms of work—the way employers and employees feel about each other, and the management procedures, trade union practices, and government interventions that go with the employment way of organising work.

As I have said, the fact is that employment now seems to be becoming an uneconomic way of getting work done. (The same thing happened to slavery in its time, as both Adam Smith and Karl Marx understood very well.⁵) This being so, employers will continue, as a general rule, to try to reduce the number of their employees, and many potential employers will continue to try to avoid employing people altogether. Employers and potential employers alike will from now on aim to minimise their dependence on employment, and to find other ways of getting work done. At the same time, as job opportunities continue to become more scarce for people who would still choose to be employed if they could, more and more of them will decide to seek other ways of working. This new factor may very well override the link between economic upswing and returning full employment which has characterised the cyclical long waves of the industrial age.

The third main argument used to support the idea that employment will continue to be the dominant form of work, and that employment will eventually become available for all who want it, is that working time will continue to fall. People in jobs will work fewer hours in the day, fewer days in the week, fewer weeks in the year, and fewer years in a lifetime, than they do now. This will mean that more jobs will be available for more people. This, it is said, is the way we should set about restoring full employment.

There is no doubt that something of this kind will happen. The shorter working week, longer holidays, earlier retirement, more sabbaticals, job-sharing — these and other ways of reducing the amount of time people spend on their jobs — are certainly likely to spread. A mix of part-time paid work and part-time unpaid work is likely to become a much more common work pattern

than today, and a flexilife pattern of work-involving paid employment at certain stages of life, but not at others, will become widespread. But it is surely unrealistic to assume that this will make it possible either to restore full employment, or to maintain employment as the dominant form of work.

In the first place, so long as employment remains the overwhelmingly important form of work and source of income for most people that it is today, it is very difficult to see how reductions in employees' working time can take place on a scale sufficiently large and at a pace sufficiently fast to make it possible to share out the available paid employment to everyone who wants it. Such negotiations as there have recently been, for example in Britain and Germany, about the possibility of introducing a 35-hour working week, have highlighted some of the difficulties. But, secondly, if changes of this kind were to take place at a pace and on a scale sufficient to make it possible to share employment among all who wanted it, the resulting situation — in which most people would not be working in their jobs for more than two or three short days a week— could hardly continue to be one in which employment was still regarded as the only truly valid form of work. There would be so many people spending so much of their time on other activities, including other forms of useful work, that the primacy of employment would be bound to be called into question, at least to some extent.

To sum up, the prospect of a successful return to conventional full employment, whether through short-term economic recovery, or through a long-term economic upswing in some years' time, or through a reduction in the time worked by employees, does not provide any more realistic a basis for dealing with the present crisis of unemployment and work, than does the simple assumption that jobs lost in industry will be automatically replaced by new jobs in services. Common sense and compassion now demand that we work out the implications of this — in other words, that we examine the possibility of encouraging other activities in place of employment, of enabling people to receive an income in other ways than from employment, and of removing the causes of personal distress and social damage that now attach to the condition of being

unemployed.

Leisure In Place of Work — A Realistic Goal?

The idea that in a post-employment society employment could be largely replaced by leisure activities, and that increasing numbers of people could live lives of leisure, is open to serious question from two points of view.

First, many people without employment would resist the idea that they were expected to make no useful contribution, either towards meeting their own needs or towards meeting those of other people, and were merely expected to keep themselves amused and out of trouble. They would resent the sense of uselessness and futility which this would imply, and feel that their lives were condemned to be empty of value and meaning. It is not as if most of us today are heirs to an aristocratic tradition of cultured leisure. We have inherited the protestant work ethic, and the need to feel useful which goes with it.

Second, many of the people still in employment would resent the idea that they were expected to support large numbers of idle drones. The situation would be one in which the employed were perceived as doing all the useful work and the unemployed were seen, on a larger scale and a more permanent basis than today, as making no useful contribution to society. People's feelings would be very different from what they would be if being employed were seen as only one of a number of ways of doing useful work and of making a positive contribution to society.

The question of how to finance the leisure of the unemployed in a leisure society would thus be a difficult one. They would need a money income. Thus some extension of today's unemployment and social security benefits systems would be needed, perhaps going as far as the introduction of a Guaranteed Basic Income (GBI). (See Chapters 4 and 12 for further discussion.) But this would be much more difficult to introduce in the context of a society clearly split between workers and non-workers, than in the context of a society in which it was understood that the purpose of the basic income was to give all citizens the freedom to choose their own mix of paid and unpaid work.

Finally, if anything resembling the leisure society did come about, one thing is sure. Many of those at leisure would in fact use their time for useful activities of many kinds. In other words, they would find ways of working on their own account, to provide useful goods and services for themselves and for one another. A leisure society would automatically transform itself, at least to some extent, into an ownwork society.

In short, the prospect of moving towards a leisure society cannot be accepted as providing any more realistic a solution to the present crisis of unemployment and work, than the hope of an eventual return to full employment. A vital element is missing. This is the expansion of ownwork — that is, work undertaken, often in forms other than conventional employment, in the local and household sectors.

The Significance of Ownwork

The actual future of work, as I have said, will be one in which employment, leisure and ownwork will all have a part to play. One aim must be to improve the existing organisation of employment — from several points of view, including greater efficiency of results, more satisfying conditions of work, and fairer distribution of the jobs which are available. Another aim must be to provide improved opportunities for leisure. But no less important than either of these will be to make possible a great expansion of ownwork — in fact, there are compelling reasons for giving this priority over both employment and leisure.

The first is that the expansion of ownwork will be a necessary precondition to achieving the other two aims. Indeed, a significant expansion is probably the only means now of creating conditions in which an internationally competitive economy and a firmly founded welfare state can flourish. This is because the development of productive and useful work in the local and household sectors will reduce the present dependency of localities and households on jobs provided by the large-scale manufacturing and service sectors of the economy, as well as on goods and services purchased from these sectors or provided by them at public expense. This reduction of dependency will have a double significance. In the first place it will contribute directly to the wellbeing of the localities and households concerned, many of

whom are today suffering unemployment and hardship as a result of failed dependency on employing and social welfare organisations outside their own control. But also, by relieving the big manufacturing and services sectors of their present function of providing routine work and routine services for localities and households which could organise such work and provide such services for themselves, the expansion of ownwork will free those organisations to become more efficient in their own proper spheres. This will help big firms to become more competitive in international markets, and enable the big service organisations like the National Health Service to concentrate on the provision of sophisticated, specialist services, like hi-tech hospital facilities, which self-help and mutual aid at local and household levels clearly cannot provide. In other words, the revival of the household and local economies, and the expansion of the kinds of work that contribute to them, will be a vital precondition for the successful further development of the big organisations of the national economy and the welfare state. It will, in fact, be the essential feature of any successful strategy to improve the efficiency and the international competitiveness of the economy as a whole.

Another important reason for giving priority to an expansion of ownwork is that it represents a new departure, a positive change of direction, from the industrial-age path of development that we have been on for the last 200 or 300 years. If we concentrate on employment or leisure as the nub of the problem, we stay stuck in the assumptions and categories of thinking of the industrial age. Exploring how to encourage ownwork enables us to identify many obstacles to further progress that arise directly from those old assumptions.

A preliminary exploration of that kind is in Chapter 4. But first, in Chapter 3, we shall look at some of the main characteristics of employment that have evolved during the industrial age. This historical background illuminates, by contrast, a number of features of work that will be important from now on.

3

The Age of Employment

Employment has been the way that industrial societies and the industrial age have organised work. In no other societies and in no other period of history has work been organised that way.

*Pre-Industrial Patterns of Work*¹

In pre-industrial times most men and women worked in and around their homes. The household was a place of production and work. Its work was linked into the work of the local village community. People provided the necessities of life for themselves and their families. Money, therefore, played a smaller part in their lives than it does in ours. Most of their work was unpaid.

Men and women divided the household tasks between them. Children helped their parents at work as soon as they were old enough; they got most of their education that way. The older generation helped, too; grandmothers looked after the younger children at home, while their parents were out working in the fields. Work, like other activities, was thus an integral part of family and local life. Not only were many of today's particular specialisms unknown, but more generally, the economic and social spheres of work were not then distinguished as separate domains. The creation of wealth and the provision of welfare were not treated as separate functions. The production of goods and the provision of services by people for themselves and one another were interwoven threads in the fabric of daily life.

It would be wrong to romanticise the nature of the family and village life and work in pre-industrial times. Very few people in today's industrial societies would want to return to that way of life. Most people then were poorer and less healthy than we are today. Their lives were shorter and less secure.

They had virtually none of the technology that we now have, and little knowledge of science or of the wider world beyond their own locality. They had few of the entertainments, holidays and travel opportunities open to us today. For many there was no escape from the tyranny of the local squire; and, for many women and young people, there was no choice but to accept their subordinate position in the patriarchal household.

Nonetheless, the prevailing pattern of work had convivial² features which employment today often lacks. Self-service, self-help, self-reliance and co-operative mutual aid were characteristics of that way of life and work. Economic and social relationships then were predominantly personal and interpersonal, not impersonal and organisational as they are today. People generally had ready access to the means of production — the land, buildings, equipment and livestock they needed for their work. No one then foresaw the day when people would be dependent on employers to provide them with the wherewithal for work, and when people would have no work to do unless employers were able and willing to organise it for them.

The Situation Now

In late industrial society the situation is quite different. Men and women alike have been taught to look outside the home for work — for the kind of work that brings in money. We need far more money than our pre-industrial ancestors did, to pay for the goods and services that we no longer provide for ourselves and one another. Moreover, we have become dependent on paid work and other work outside the home to give us a sense of identity, a social role, that the diminished functions of our households and immediate neighbourhoods can no longer supply. Most of us need such work to enable us to meet people, and to provide us with a way of structuring our time — needs which the isolated, unproductive homes of late industrial society have become less and less able to meet. 'I'm only a housewife' sums up the sense of deprivation, loss of personal confidence, and lack of social status experienced by the typical contemporary homemaker.

This change in the pattern of people's lives has been one of the most important features of the way society has developed during the industrial age. Once that direction of development had

been established, it was cumulative and self-reinforcing. As more and more people looked to paid work outside the home, so they became less and less able to meet the needs of those — especially the young and the old and the sick members of their families — who had previously depended on their presence at home. So, increasingly, those dependents had to look outside the home too, to institutions like schools and hospitals, for their education and care. And that, in turn, created new jobs in those institutions — new openings for paid employment — which pulled more people away from work in their homes.

Employment as Dependency

This change in the dominant pattern of work has transformed people's lives and the life of society. The effect on people's freedom to control their own work has been one of its most important features.

Before the industrial age all human societies, except perhaps hunter-gatherer tribes, had been societies of superiors and inferiors. In ancient societies slaves had worked for their masters, and in medieval societies serfs and villeins had worked for their lords. Such societies had not claimed to be societies of free and equal, fully developed people, in command of their own work and sharing its fruits with their fellows. Now that employees worked for employers, did this represent progress?

In theory, the replacement of serfdom and villeinage by paid employment should have been a step forward. Relieved of their old feudal obligations to their lords, people on the face of it became free to offer their work as equals in the market place to anyone who would buy it. In the last 200 to 300 years many self-made men made out successfully in this way,³ and for many women over the years the opportunity of employment outside the home came as a liberation.⁴ But for many people the change from feudal to industrial-age patterns of work had the opposite effect. More powerfully than ever before it compelled the majority of the population to work for other people. It resulted in the division of society into two nations — employers and employees — as society had never been divided before.⁵ As Christopher Hill puts it, "What most men felt was not that new doors had been thrown open but that old rights had been taken away."⁶

In England, the pressure started in the 16th century when the monasteries were dissolved. With the resulting break-up of the great feudal estates, most of the villeins were turned into landless wage-labourers. Later the enclosures of the 17th and 18th centuries deprived the common people of their rights to graze cattle, pick up timber, and hunt animals on the common lands, and further increased their dependence on paid labour. This was well understood at the time. Enclosure of the commons was positively praised by contemporaries in the knowledge that it forced labourers to "work every day in the year", and that "their children will be put out to labour early".⁷ By depriving them of any chance of economic independence, the "subordination of the lower ranks of society would be thereby considerably secured". Harsh penalties had been imposed on the workless poor under the Poor Law from the 16th century, and harsh restrictions on labour mobility under laws such as the great Statute of Artificers of 1563. Enclosures now made doubly sure that for people who had no property there was no escape from a semi-servile state and from their "duty to work for their betters". So a pool of ready labour became available for employers.

The coming of the factory system drove work out of the home and brought a further loss of independence at work:

Weaving had offered an employment to the whole family: the young children winding bobbins, older children watching for faults, picking over the cloth, or helping to throw the shuttle in the broad-loom; adolescents working a second or third loom; the wife taking a turn at weaving in and among her domestic employments. The family was together, and however poor meals were, at least they could sit down at chosen times. A whole pattern of family and community life had grown up around the loom-shops; work did not prevent conversation or singing. The spinning-mills which offered employment only for their children, and then the power-loom sheds which generally employed only the wives or adolescents, were resisted until poverty broke down all defences.⁸

Masculine, Impersonal Work

Another feature of the employment age was the split that developed between men's work and women's work. As employment became the dominant form of work in the 19th and 20th centuries, the father typically became the breadwinner going out to work, the mother the housewife staying at home. Money loomed large in people's lives, with the paid work of men

enjoying a higher status than the unpaid work of women. Eventually this led women to insist that they should have rights to employment equal with those of men, and women now have a somewhat fairer deal where paid work is concerned. But progress towards equality has been lop-sided; most men still remain unwilling and unable to do their fair share of the unpaid work of running the household and raising the family. They continue to assume that the really important work is that done for employers for pay, and so they give it priority. Most men have lost sight of the possibility that they might devote their energies to their own purposes, and work directly for the wellbeing and development of themselves, their families, their neighbours and their friends.

As industrialisation progressed, the impersonal character of employment, and of industrial society as a whole, became more marked. In its early stages the employer/employee relationship often remained a personal one, as it does in many small businesses today. Employer and employee perceived each other as individual people, and dealt with one another that way — humanely or brutally as the case might be.⁹ But the technologies typical of the industrial age required division of labour and specialisation of work. They thus favoured large-scale organisation. Having pulled work out of the home into the factory, the new industrial technologies then led to the replacement of small factories by big ones. Partly for this reason — and partly because both capitalism and collectivism treated workers as subordinate instruments of larger impersonal purposes — personal control of employees by employers came to be replaced by impersonal management systems.

At the same time, the urbanisation of work brought with it a less personal, more anonymous, way of life in the great industrial cities and towns. Moreover, as rail and then road transport became established, people commuted longer and longer distances to work. In today's late industrial society, many people have come to accept that the energies which they channel into their work will be expended far away from their nearest and dearest, and on purposes unconnected with their home and the locality in which they live.

So, although most people have come to take for granted the form of work, i.e. employment, which has been dominant in the

late industrial age, many have experienced it as disconnected from other aspects of their lives and as having comparatively little intrinsic value of its own. Many, perhaps most, employees have not expected to achieve a serious purpose of their own or a meaning for themselves through their work. They have worked in order to be paid and in order to achieve self-esteem, social respect, companionship and time-structure to their daily life. Typical in this respect of their age and social background were a group of young people studied in the Manchester area during the 1970s.

For those youngsters work is something to be endured in order to acquire the resources to enable the further enjoyment of non-work activities. It has no intrinsic value and nothing to commend it as an inherently worthwhile activity — though, of course, certain sources of satisfaction can be found and these enclaves are highly prized as the primary source of day-to-day diversion: 'Good mates', 'getting around', 'having a laugh'. Nevertheless it is not an area in which they locate any potential for personal achievement or improvement, and their interests and more meaningful activities are either peripheral to, or entirely divorced from, it.¹⁰

Job dissatisfaction has always been widespread among adult workers too. For example, "For the many there is a hardly concealed discontent. The blue-collar blues is no more bitterly sung than the white-collar moan."¹¹ And: "We find the blues of blue-collar workers linked to their job dissatisfactions as in the disgruntlement of white-collar workers and the growing discontent among managers. Many workers at all occupational levels feel locked in, their mobility blocked, the opportunity to grow lacking in their jobs, challenge missing from their task."¹²

Exclusive Nature of Employment

However, the only alternative to a job which has been open to most people in late industrial society — unemployment — cannot provide the self-esteem, social respect, companionship and time structure that people seek from work. People who have not had employment, or have been ineligible for it, have been made to feel inferior. Women are not the only members of society whose work status has been downgraded during the industrial age by the ever growing dominance of employment over other forms of work. People reaching retirement age have been made to feel their useful life is over. Teenagers not yet eligible to join the

labour market have been made to feel they can make no useful contribution. Unemployed people of working age have been made to feel excluded and marginalised. Law and custom have dissuaded old, young and unemployed alike from doing useful work of an informal kind. Unemployed people have even been forbidden to commit themselves to voluntary work or to self-chosen courses of education and training, on pain of losing their unemployment pay. The choice has tended to become a simple either/or — *either* you have a job *or* you don't work, *either* your contribution to the economy takes the form of a job *or* you are perceived as a burden and a cost to be carried by those who do have jobs.

These general pressures pushing everyone eligible into employment have been reinforced by many others of a more specific kind. Until very recently, personnel managements have discouraged part-time jobs, especially for men. Pension practices have discouraged flexible working lives and early retirement. Social security arrangements have encouraged single parents to seek full-time employment. Trade union pressures have sought to reserve work for full-time employees. As continually inflating land prices have made it more difficult for ordinary people to buy land, and as the numbers of small firms and small farms have declined over the years, the opportunities for self-employment have declined, too. Only in the last year or two have there been signs of change.

In short, so far as individual people are concerned, the continually growing dominance of employment as a way of organising work has tended to limit people's freedom to work for their own chosen purposes and in their own chosen ways. It has tended to limit their satisfaction in work if they are employed, and to exclude them from what is regarded as useful work if they are not. It has kept them dependent on increasingly remote employers to provide them with work, and has made them vulnerable to decisions about their work which are right outside their own control.

Dependency of Local Communities

Much the same has happened to the work of localities as has happened to the work of individual people during the employment age. Local work has become increasingly controlled

by decisions taken elsewhere. Just as households lost control over their own work, so towns and districts lost control of theirs. Just as people became enmeshed in the impersonal forces of the labour market, so local communities became enmeshed in the impersonal forces of national and international economies. Just as the work of people became vulnerable to events far removed from their own lives, so the work of local communities became vulnerable to economic cycles, industrial innovations, and other events far removed from theirs. Throughout the industrial age, increasing specialisation and division of labour locally, regionally and nationally diminished the capacity of local communities to organise their work and secure a livelihood for themselves, just as personal specialisation and division of labour diminished that same capacity in individual people.

At the pre-industrial stage of development most local communities, like most households, were much more self-sufficient than they are today. Work done locally met a greater proportion of local needs - for example, for food, clothing, shelter, heat and power. External trading, accompanied by the earning and spending of money outside the local community, was a smaller part of economic life in most places than it is today.

As the industrial age progressed, local control of the economic aspects of life seeped away. Just as most people became dependent on employers to provide them with work, so — similarly — most localities became dependent for their work on employing organisations based elsewhere. Just as most people ceased to be able to provide themselves with the necessities of life and became dependent on buying them in, so — similarly — most localities became dependent on goods and services brought in from industries and public service organisations based elsewhere. Just as most people became dependent on earning in and spending out money, so — similarly — many local communities came to be dependent on money coming in from outside and going straight out again, not circulating locally and thereby supporting local work. Just as in late industrial society the family and the household came to be perceived as part of the social rather than the economic domain, so the sphere of local government came to be perceived as primarily social, not economic. It is only in the last few years that in Britain, for example, local authorities have begun to take on responsibilities

for local employment and local economic development.

An extreme example of local economic dependency can be found in some tourist districts. It is most obvious in islands — as, for example, in Greece. In the tourist season, as the boatloads and planeloads of tourists come in, they are accompanied by boatloads and planeloads of food for them to eat, liquor for them to drink, souvenirs and other holiday goods for them to buy, and people to serve them in the restaurants and hotels. Little self-sustaining local production or work is generated. When the season is over, the tourists go home. All they leave behind is rubbish — and the local people waiting for the next tourist season.

That is, as I say, an extreme example. More typical forms of economic dependency and vulnerability, found all over the industrialised world, are where local economies have become dependent on industries like ship-building, steel-making, railway repair and manufacture, automobiles, nickel-mining, coal-mining, or whatever other industry it may be, controlled by national or multinational companies, or by national governments or international government agencies, based outside the district. As the economic climate has changed and these industries have gone into decline, two things have become apparent. First, the people who take decisions about the future of these industries have no particular commitment to the localities affected; they live elsewhere themselves; they are absentee landlords of their industrial estates - absentee worklords, you might say. Second, the people in the affected localities, having specialised in those industries and having become dependent on them, have lost whatever alternative skills and resources and alternative traditions of work they might once have had. They now have no capacity to organise work for themselves, which they can fall back on. They are in a very vulnerable position.

In response to this situation, in many parts of the industrialised world in recent years, representatives of central governments and local authorities have been competing with one another to attract new national and multinational employers to their cities and districts. They are all looking for new industries which will replace the old steel, or shipbuilding, or other, industries whose decline has left high unemployment. In thus

seeking to replace the old absentee worklords with new ones, development agencies everywhere have blindly sought to perpetuate the vulnerability of local communities to employment decisions outside their own control. So deeply rooted is the assumption that work must be externally provided, that it has hardly occurred to these agencies to consider the possibility of helping their communities to build up greater local economic autonomy, including the capacity to organise local work to meet an increasing proportion of local needs.

In the third world, too, the growing dependency of local economies on outside control has followed much the same principle. They became dependent on the cultivation of cash crops for export to the industrialised countries. All over the third world local people were persuaded, and often compelled, to grow export crops like coffee, tea, tobacco, cocoa, cotton, sisal, rubber and sugar, instead of using their land and developing their skills to grow food, timber and other crops for their own use. Markets for these cash crops have been altogether outside local control, and terms of trade have usually been unfavourable. Moreover, the production of these crops has typically been controlled by companies based outside the country concerned - absentee worklords again. Work which is organised and controlled in this way is bound to be dangerously vulnerable to decisions and developments over which the workers themselves have no control at all.

As labour costs have grown in the industrialised world in recent years, multinational companies have begun to move their manufacturing operations to the third world, adding the features of local economic dependency that have been characteristic of the industrialised world to those that have accompanied the production of commodities and cash crops for international markets. In recent years multinational companies have also been stepping up their efforts to make third world people more dependent on the purchase of consumer products, babyfoods being probably the most notorious example. One consequence, as of any extension of the consumer society, has been to deepen people's dependence on paid employment to provide them with money to spend on consumer products which they cannot provide by their own efforts for themselves.

Limits to Employment

To sum up, two key features of the path of development that has characterised all industrialised and industrialising societies have been: the increasing dominance of employment over other forms of work; and the increasing subordination of local work and local economies to outside control. The principle in both cases is the same. Just as individual people in their own households have lost the freedom, and the capacity, and the habit, to meet their own needs directly by their own work, and have become more and more dependent on paid employment outside their own control to provide them with money to buy goods and services, so local communities have lost the freedom, and the capacity, and the habit, to meet their needs directly by their own work. They too have become more and more dependent on externally organised work to provide an inflow of money from outside, which is then spent on buying in from outside the goods and services required to meet local needs.

In short, as the industrial-age way of organising work as employment has become ever more deeply engrained in the structures of industrialised and industrialising societies, it has turned work into a form of activity which is dependent, remotely controlled, and instrumental. Work in the post-industrial age will have to develop in a positively different direction. It will have to become more autonomous, more self-controlled, and more directly related to the needs and purposes of those who are doing the work. As we reach the end of the employment age, it is becoming urgent to think out how to reverse some of the main features of employment as a way of organising work.

4

A Change of Direction

The change of direction to new, post-industrial patterns of work will affect every aspect of human life and society just as profoundly as they have been affected by the rise of employment during the industrial age. This chapter gives a broad impression of some aspects of this, and identifies some of the industrial-age assumptions that will have to be reversed. The practicalities of the transition to ownwork will be considered in greater detail in Part 4.

As the last chapter made clear, the nature of work in the industrial age has meant that the work of people and communities has tended to be exploited for purposes not directly connected with their own needs, or their own purposes and values. This impersonal aspect of industrial-age work, and the lack of a sense of personal and local responsibility for the results of work that it has brought with it, have also contributed to another important feature of work in the industrial age — its concentration on the exploitation, consumption and destruction of natural resources. The vision of a SHE future, with ownwork as a characteristic feature of it, foresees a new work order that is:

- *saner*, in the sense that people and communities will have greater control over their work and greater opportunities to use it directly to meet their own needs, including the need for healthy self-development;
- more *humane*, in the sense that people's work will not only be less exploited for purposes alien to them, but will also be less exploitative and damaging to other people; and also
- more *ecological*, in the sense that work will be more concerned with ways to live harmoniously and sustainably with the natural environment, than with ways of exploiting it. These basic features of work in the post-industrial age will have many practical implications.

Energy

Work is closely related to energy. The word 'work' is derived from the Greek word for work, *ergon*, and the word 'energy', also derived from the Greek, refers to that which has work in it. In other words, energy is the capacity for work. In science an 'erg' is a unit of work or energy.

Throughout history the kinds of work people have done and the ways they have worked have been connected with their uses of energy. People have used the energies of other human beings; of creatures like horses, cattle, donkeys and elephants; and of the sun, wind and water. They have also used energies derived from such vegetable and fossil fuels as wood, oil, coal and gas.

The industrial age has been the fossil-fuel age. Its prime source of energy has been first coal, then oil. The availability of these fuels, and the prevailing techniques for obtaining and using them, have affected the very nature of work. So one question we must ask is: What will *post*-industrial society use as its energy base? And what will this mean for work?

The HE vision of post-industrial society assumes that nuclear power will steadily replace existing, unrenovable sources of energy. Such a society would thus be centralised. In its provision of energy, it would be a Big Brother society, split between an expert minority of producers — a technocratic elite — and a dependent majority of consumers — the latter denied the opportunity of playing any part at all in meeting either their energy or their other basic needs.

The change of direction we envisage, however, in accordance with the SHE vision of post-industrial society in which ownwork is the norm, is towards a society more decentralised and self-reliant in its provision and use of energy, and in all else. Efficient use and conservation of energy will reduce its consumption, and therefore its need; the development of renewable energy sources like the sun and wind will remove the need to develop nuclear power; and the harnessing of such sources at local and household levels will mean that many more people, not fewer, will play a part in meeting their own and others' energy and other basic needs.¹

Moving in this new direction will also enable many more people to channel their psychic, as well as their physical,

energies into useful work. An important characteristic of the post-industrial age will be a freer flow of people's energies into the central activities of their lives.²

Technology

It was not only in meeting people's needs for energy — for warmth and power and light — that the technologies of the industrial age drove work out of households and local communities into factories and offices, cities and towns. They have had that effect on every kind of work. Thereby, they have been socially divisive. The cottager can afford a handloom, but only the factory owner can afford a powerloom. The smallholder can afford a plough, but only the agribusinessman can afford the agricultural technologies of the 1980s. Only the richer Indian peasant can afford the technologies of the 'green revolution', which then transform his poorer neighbours into his hired labour.

The Business-As-Usual view of the future assumes that technology will still have this social effect on the organisation of work. People will typically continue to work as employees for employers, because only employers will be able to afford large-scale technologies and have the capacity to manage large organisations. The HE vision expects advances in technology to accentuate the split in society between the elite workers and the drones. The big technologies of the super-industrial future — nuclear power stations, automated chemical plants, automated production lines, factories in space, and so on — would be controlled and operated by a very small number of people. The rest of us would become redundant as workers. As consumers we would become even more dependent than we are today on big technologies and organisations, and on the people who operate them and manage them.

The change of direction towards ownwork, on the other hand, will reflect the fact that miniaturisation is now the new frontier of technology. Whereas the technology of the industrial age drove work out of the home and the neighbourhood, and deprived most people of the freedom to control their work, the technology of the post-industrial age will make it possible to reverse this trend. Already the washing machine has largely replaced laundries, and the home computer and many other advanced small-scale equipments and 'user-friendly' materials for building, decorating,

repairing, servicing, heating, plumbing, electrics, food growing, food preparation, clothing and furnishing, are coming in. In a few years' time small, programmable industrial robots will be available, costing little more than the present price of a family car. This will make it possible for small engineering workshops, attached — like garages — to people's homes, to provide local markets with many kinds of goods which economies of scale have reserved for mass production during the industrial age. The technology of the SHE future will be the technology of self-service, self-employment and self-reliance — the technology of a society which enables free people to choose their own work.³

Environment

The dominant pattern of work in the industrial age, and the ways in which we have used energy and technology, have significantly affected the environment in which we live.

First, there have been changes that we tend now to take for granted. The houses and the cities, towns and villages we live in have been shaped, and have shaped themselves, around the dominant work culture, i.e. employment. We now live in houses which, for the most part, have been designed as places of consumption and leisure rather than as places of production and work. Domestic architecture on the one hand and industrial and commercial architecture on the other have evolved to serve two separated functions and to meet two separated sets of needs. Similarly, in our cities, towns and villages the areas where people live are generally separate from the areas where they work. Planners have been taught that people work on employers' premises, and have learned to separate the spaces needed for living and working into distinct residential and industrial zones. Planning regulations positively prevent many people from working in or around their own homes today.

Patterns of transport, similarly, reflect the dominant pattern of work. A sizeable proportion of rail and road traffic is commuter traffic, that is people travelling from their homes to their places of work in the morning, and back again at the end of their working day. Much of the rest is business traffic — transport of goods and materials, and travel by people in the course of their work. This reflects today's high degree of division of labour and specialisation of work. People in their own place cannot now

provide themselves with the products, services and skills they need. These have to be transported in from elsewhere.

Then there have been the changes to the environment that we notice as destructive and damaging. New ways of working in agriculture have damaged the countryside, for example by farmers grubbing up hedgerows and woodlands.⁴ New industries have polluted water and air with chemicals. Heavy lorries travelling through residential communities have spoiled people's quality of life. New roads, new housing, new airports, new factories have spread a blanket of concrete over more and more land. Globally, today's ways of working are destroying the rain forests, polluting the atmosphere and the rivers and lakes and oceans, altering the climatic balance, and eliminating growing numbers of living species. Increasing numbers of people are beginning to question ways of working and living that put at risk the biosphere, the fabric of life, of which we ourselves are part.⁵

The Business-As-Usual view of the future, which assumes that employment will remain the dominant form of work, takes for granted that today's patterns of housing, planning and transport will remain basically unchanged. Insofar as the Business-As-Usual view admits that further 'progress' of a conventional kind may have damaging environmental effects, it relies on conventional methods of restriction and control — legislation, financial inducements, international negotiation — to limit the damage so caused.

Since the setback to the credibility of tower blocks and other aspects of the technocratic approach to housing and planning that was typical of the 1960s and early 1970s, proponents of the HE vision of the future have said little about the housing, planning and transport implications of a leisure society in which most people would have no work. Their assumption seems to be that, as people became even more dependent as consumers and clients on organisations and professionals than they are today — fast-food chains, cable television, universities for the elderly, bereavement clinics, and so on — new technologies and new forms of professional expertise would enable housing, planning and transport to adapt as necessary. So far as damage to the environment is concerned, the HE view appears to take it for granted likewise that scientific and professional expertise and the

development of new and improved technologies will provide the necessary solutions.

The change of direction which we envisage, however, will be based, at least partly, on recognition that the prevailing patterns of housing, planning and transport are closely linked to the damage now being done to the environment. Both stem from the kind of work that has been dominant during the industrial age - work which has exploited people and nature alike as if both were expendable resources. The patterns of housing, planning and transport, and of industry and agriculture, towards which a saner, more humane, more ecological future will require us to move, will be those reflecting the new assumption that ownwork is the normal form of work. And such a society will by its very nature be more conserving of the natural environment.

In practice, this change of direction means that we must begin to plan and build *now*.⁶ For example, more space will be required in and around people's homes for productive work. When new neighbourhoods and localities are planned and developed, provision should be made for space and facilities that will enable local production, e.g. of food and energy, to make a contribution to local consumption. These will be particularly important features of *urban* redevelopment, where the physical structure of the old inner cities reflects the centralised, mass-production, mass-consumption, employment-dependent character of the declining industrial-age society.

*Leisure*⁷

As employment became the dominant form of work, the distinction between work and leisure became sharper. The word 'leisure' means free time, and leisure activities came to mean what people did in the time they had to themselves, as contrasted with work which was what people did in the time claimed by their employer. This distinction between work and leisure has always been clearer for employees than for people who have organised their own work, like housewives or the self-employed. This is linked with the fact that, in general, men in industrial societies have tended to enjoy more leisure than women.

Another distinction between work and leisure became sharper

as employment became the dominant form of work. As work increasingly came to be activity which brought in money, so leisure increasingly came to be activity on which money had to be spent. A widening range of leisure industries and services grew up providing leisure goods and leisure facilities. Some of these were in the so-called private sector; people purchased leisure goods like hi-fis and services like package holidays from them directly. Others were in the so-called public sector; these were paid for out of public expenditure, financed by taxation, and the goods and services which they provided - like public swimming pools - were available to people free or at a reduced cost.

The shift from informal to formally organised work during the industrial age was thus paralleled by a comparable shift in the sphere of leisure. Whereas in pre-industrial societies most people organised leisure, like work, for themselves and one another, in late industrial societies they became dependent on the organisations of the formal economy to provide them with leisure activities as well as providing them with work.

One way of thinking about the future of leisure, as about the future of work, is to ask who controls people's time.

Employment has meant that employees lose control of their working time by selling it to their employers, and employers gain control of their employees' time by buying it from them. Something similar is true of leisure. As leisure industries and services have developed, people at leisure have increasingly spent their time on activities devised for them by others, including commercial organisations and public services. By contrast in self-organised leisure — as in ownwork — people take control of the use of their own time. (There is, incidentally, a close connection between control over time and control over space. Employers normally control their employees' workspace, just as they control their worktime. Most employees have no workspace of their own. Similarly, leisure-providers normally control the space, as well as the time, used for leisure by their customers and clients.)

As people are required to spend less time in employment, they will have more time for leisure. The HE vision of post-industrial society foresees people spending most of this extra free time

consuming leisure products and in leisure activities provided by leisure industries, leisure services and organised entertainment. People's leisure will be mainly outer-directed, just as their work has been outer-directed in employment. The SHE vision, on the other hand, foresees people using their increased free time in accordance with their own perceptions of value and need. The use they make of it will blur the distinction between leisure and ownwork.

Another way of thinking about the future of leisure is to distinguish between leisure activities that have to be paid for and leisure activities that do not—just as one way of thinking about the future of work is to distinguish between work that people get paid for and work that they do not. For example, there are leisure activities and facilities which cost a substantial amount of money. Foreign holidays are one example. Local authority sports centres are another. There are also leisure activities which cost comparatively little money, like walking or reading. Thirdly, there are leisure activities which save money. If you grow your own food and do your own repairs, you can eat better and live better for less money. Fourthly, there are leisure activities which can be turned into money-earning activities. Hobbies like photography and keeping chickens might be examples.

The Business-As-Usual view of the future of work assumes that leisure industries and services will continue to grow. The assumption is that people will still have jobs, and so will still have money to purchase leisure goods and services and to pay taxes and rates for public leisure facilities. The growth in this category of leisure is itself expected to be a source of new jobs.

The HE view assumes that many people will not have jobs, and will be dependent on being provided with leisure activities to fill their time. In this case, there would be a sharp distinction between the leisure-providers, who would be skilled and dedicated workers, and the consumers of leisure, who would play little part in providing or organising leisure for themselves - just as, more generally, most people would play little part in meeting any of their own needs. The question of how these leisure activities would be financed, when many of the people enjoying them would not be earning incomes from employment, is one to which we shall return.

As already outlined, a change of direction towards ownwork and the SHE future will involve a shift of emphasis away from leisure industries and services to leisure organised by people for themselves. The dividing line between ownwork and this kind of leisure will often be difficult to draw. People will make use of their leisure - the increasing amount of time at their own disposal — to do useful work on their own account, on their own interests and on their own projects. Leisure activities will then shade into a much wider range of work and activity options than most people have today, when for most people leisure is what they have when not at work, and the two main options are either to work or to be unemployed.

Education and Training

Education and training in industrial society have been geared to the assumption that work means employment. For most people the purpose of education has been to prepare them to do a job; the better their education, the better the job they have been likely to get. Similarly, most training has been aimed at preparing the trainee to function better as an employee in a particular job. At the same time, a comparatively small elite have been educated, not to become employees, but to take their place as members of the employer class. One of the key social divisions in education during the industrial age has thus been related to the social division between employers and employees. That social division was typical of industrial society at its peak. It has retained its cultural and social significance in late industrial society, even though many supposedly superior people— such as top company executives, heads of universities, and internationally renowned scientists - are employees of the organisations in which they work.

The Business-As-Usual criticism of education in recent years is that education has failed to prepare people properly for employment. The outstanding new initiatives in Britain, for example, have been to do with Youth Training and Work Experience, in the sense of giving young people education, training and experience that will equip them to be more effective as employees.

The HE view of the future, on the other hand, stresses the need for education in two particular fields. For potential members

of the technocratic elite, education should concentrate on instilling the skills needed for using and developing the new advanced technologies, for example in the microelectronic and bio-engineering fields. For the mass of the people, by contrast, the key should be education for leisure, and education should concentrate on preparing them to use the leisure time that will loom so largely in their lives.

A change of direction towards ownwork will involve a shift of emphasis towards education and training in the practical skills, including the personal and interpersonal skills, that will help people to live rewarding lives outside employment, to make productive use of their leisure, and to do useful and satisfying work of their own. Education for resourcefulness, self-sufficiency, and co-operative self-reliance will be what is *most* needed.

Incomes

People who live in late industrial societies have to have a money income in order to buy the goods and services required to meet their needs. As a rule, we are able to meet few of our own needs directly by our own efforts, as our pre-industrial ancestors largely did.

Late industrial societies accept an obligation to ensure that all their citizens do receive a money income sufficient to enable them to subsist. But the assumption still is that the normal way to get this income is from paid employment, either directly as an employee or indirectly as a dependent of an employee. People who get their income from the state, for example, in the form of unemployment benefit or social security benefit, are treated as unfortunate exceptions to this general rule. They are regarded as second-class citizens, and are subjected to severe restrictions. These limit their freedom to commit themselves to useful activities, such as training or voluntary work (since these might make them unavailable to take a conventional job, if one existed), and heavily discourage them from trying to build up paid work on their own account.

The Business-as-Usual view thus assumes that people who don't have a job can do no useful work; that, if they want to work, they should look for a job; and that the main objectives of government policy should be to encourage this, while creating conditions in which enough jobs will once again be available for

all.

Both the HE and SHE views of the future believe that these assumptions are out of date. They both believe that the high level of unemployment which is in prospect for the next 10 or 15 years will mark a transition to a new work order in which full employment will have become a thing of the past. They both foresee that it will then no longer be normal for most people to receive their money income in the form of wages or salary from a job, and that it will have to become regarded as normal for people to receive their money income in other ways, including regular payments from the state. They both believe that this must lead to an extension of the present system of personal benefits, and its consolidation with the personal tax system, in the form of an unconditional subsistence income or Guaranteed Basic Income (GBI). All citizens would then receive an adequate untaxed basic income from the state, and (in most versions of the idea) be allowed the freedom to top this up with additional taxed income if they chose to do so.

The HE vision of a leisure society looks upon the GBI as providing a basis on which most people would be able to live lives of leisure. But, as I suggested in Chapter 2, this raises questions to which no answers are yet in sight. The level of income required by people who were expected to do no useful work of their own and to make no useful contribution to meeting their own needs and other people's would have to be quite high, and remain so permanently. The resulting financial problems and the resentment of those who were still doing paid work and paying taxes on their earnings to support the leisured, might make this a difficult arrangement to sustain.

The SHE vision on the other hand, sees the most important function of the GBI as a transitional one. It will facilitate the change of direction to a new work order in which many people will be enabled to do more work on their own account and meet a greater proportion of their own needs by their own efforts. They will then, in aggregate, become less dependent than people are today both on the benefits system to provide all their income if they are unemployed, and on other arms of the present welfare state to provide them with social services. In other words, the GBI will enable many individual people who are now unemployed

or otherwise caught in the poverty trap which the present system of benefits imposes, to make the transition to the point where they can earn a taxable income on their own account; and, by freeing people from the need to work in useless jobs or to spend their time searching for nonexistent jobs, the GBI will give them more time to care for themselves, and one another. By thus reducing people's dependence on benefits and welfare services, the GBI will help to reduce the cost of the welfare state and the level of taxation needed to support it. It may even be possible to hope that, as over the years people generally become rather more able to do things for themselves and rather less dependent than they are today on money to buy what they cannot provide for themselves, the level of GBI required by most people to support a decent life could eventually fall. (The GBI scheme is further discussed in Chapter 12.)

Capital, Investment, Land

During the industrial age the assumption took root that employers would provide the land, the premises, the equipment and other forms of capital assets and working capital needed to support people's work.

The Business-As-Usual view of the future takes for granted that this will continue to be the case. Investment grants and other forms of financial assistance, as well as depreciation allowances to be set against tax, should therefore continue to be given to employing organisations to encourage them to invest in creating and maintaining jobs. Because employment is assumed to be the only valid form of work, it follows that employers should continue to be given this special treatment, even though it amounts to discrimination against investment in other types of work, for example in the household or local community. The HE view, while not agreeing that the creation of employment will or should continue to be a function of productive investment, accepts nevertheless that large enterprises will and should continue to be the main owners and controllers of productive capital assets, that the most important forms of production will still be those which are large and heavily capitalised, and that today's system of financial institutions channelling flows of investment from people to organisations will continue to provide a valid pattern for the future.

The SHE view, on the other hand, foresees a change of direction in this respect as in others. The shift from employment to ownwork will involve a shift in the ownership and control of productive capital assets from employing organisations to people themselves. In particular, new mechanisms and new institutions will be needed to enable people to channel their savings into investment in small-scale local activities of their own choice, including local employment initiatives of cooperative, socially beneficial types which will improve the locality in which the investor lives. New ways will have to be introduced to enable people with little or no capital of their own to build up 'sweat equity' for themselves, for example by helping to build their own houses and to develop their own new communities. New forms of land tenure, including land-holding by community land trusts and community development trusts, may be needed to enable people without capital to build up a shared stake in the land which they need for their work. More generally, new ways will have to be found for decentralising the ownership and control of land, and making it available to people and local enterprises needing land for their work, on terms which they will be able to afford. Part 4 contains further discussion of the practicalities.

Notes and References for Section 1

Introduction

- (1) Reported in the United Nations publication *Development Forum*, November 1982.
- (2) The concept of 'another development' was articulated in the 1975 Dag Hammarskjold Report *What Now? Another Development*; in *Another Development: Approaches and Strategies*, ed. Marc Nerfin, 1977; and in subsequent issues of *Development Dialogue*; all published by the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, Uppsala, Sweden. Regular issues of the *IFDA Dossier* from the International Foundation for Development Alternatives, Nyon, Switzerland, have encouraged wide international participation in the discussion.
- (3) In particular, the outcome of two Turning Point meetings in 1980 was published as Turning Point Paper No. 1 on 'The Redistribution of Work'. Major contributions were made by Charles Handy (then Warden of St. George's House, Windsor Castle) and Sheila Rothwell (Director of Employment Studies, Henley). I recommend Charles Handy's subsequent book, *The Future of Work*, Basil Blackwell, 1984. (Turning Point is an international network of people who share a common understanding that humankind is at a historical turning point. Address: The Old Bakehouse, Cholsey, Near Wallingford, Oxfordshire OX10 9NU).
The Woodbrooke College conference on the future of work in September 1982 led to the publication of *Turn A New Leaf: Six Essays On Work*, Friends House, London, 1983. Among the contributors was Guy Dauncey, whose two books *The Unemployment Handbook*, 1981, and *Nice Work If You Can Get It*, 1983 — both published by the National Extension College — I also recommend.

- (4) James Robertson, *The Sane Alternative: A Choice of Futures*, rev. ed., Robertson, 1983. As I said there, Gurth Higgin's 'Scarcity, Abundance and Depletion: The Challenge to Continuing Management Education', Inaugural Lecture, Loughborough University of Technology, 1975, provided an important stimulus to my thinking about the future of work.

Chapter 1

- (1) Detailed references are given in *The Sane Alternative*, see Introduction, Note (4) above.
- (2) For example, David Bleakley, *Work: The Shadow and the Substance*, SCM Press, 1983, argues for alternative approaches to employment and unemployment which will transcend the conventional work ethic.
- (3) Amory Lovins, *Soft Energy Paths*, Penguin, 1977.

Chapter 2

- (1) This four-sector model emerged from an international discussion at Windsor Castle in 1979 on the future of business management. See my report on 'The Changing Expectations Of Society' in *Management for the 21st Century*, Kluwer Nijhoff, 1982.
- (2) Tom Stonier, *The Wealth of Information: A Profile of the Post-Industrial Economy*, Thames Methuen, 1983. Stonier says that in 25 years "it will take no more than 10% of the labour force to provide us with all our material needs".
- (3) "There was virtual unanimity that full employment has gone for good." From the report on 'The Future of Work' by OPUS (10 Golders Rise, London NW4), after the Work and Society 'Talkabout' in West Yorkshire in October/November 1983.
- (4) For a readable account of Kondratieff cycles see Robert Beckman, *Down-wave: Surviving the Second Great Depression*, Pan, 1983. Also see Christopher Freeman's 'Science, Technology and Unemployment', Paper No. 1 in Science, Technology and Public Policy, from Science Policy Research Unit, Sussex University, 1982.
- (5) See the references to slavery in Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* and Karl Marx's *Capital*.

Chapter 3

- (1) Useful background on the work of the household and community in pre-industrial society will be found in Edward Shorter's *The Making Of The Modern Family*, Fontana, 1977; and Peter Laslett's *The World We Have Lost*, Methuen, 1971.
- (2) Ivan Illich, *Tools for Conviviality*, Calder and Boyars, 1973.
- (3) "The self-made man was the ideal entrepreneur, the man without any initial property or patronage, no education other than self-education, or any advantage other than native talent, who by self-help and force of character made his way to wealth and status." Harold Perkin, *The Origins of Modern English Society, 1780-1880*, RKP, 1969.
- (4) "From one end of Europe to the other, young unmarried women in the 19th century were rejecting traditional occupations in favour of paid employment. . . Young women in particular who left home to accept work in London were not so much responding to economic opportunity as to a means of independence from the often severe restraints on behaviour inherent in rural family life, dominated by the Victorian paterfamilias." E. Shorter, *Making of the Modern Family*.
- (5) Disraeli, *Sybil; Or The Two Nations*, OUP World Classic, 1981 (first pub. 1845). Also see Karl Polanyi's *The Great Transformation*, Beacon, 1957.
- (6) Christopher Hill, *Reformation To Industrial Revolution*, Penguin, 1969.
- (7) All quotations in this paragraph are from C Hill, *Reformation*.
- (8) E. P. Thompson, *The Making Of The English Working Class*, Penguin, 1968.
- (9) Examples of brutality will be found in E.P. Thompson, *Making of the E.W.C.*
- (10) Graham Marshall, *The Best Years Of Their Lives: Schooling, Work And Unemployment In Oldfield*, William Temple Foundation, Manchester Business School, 1980.
- (11) Studs Terkel, *Working*, Penguin, 1977.
- (12) 'Work in America', Special Task Force Report to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Cambridge, Mass., 1973, quoted by Harry Braverman, *Labor And Monopoly Capital: The Degradation Of Work In The 20th Century*, Monthly Review Press, 1974.

Chapter 4

- (1) Daniel Deudney and Christopher Flavin, *Renewable Energy: The Power To Choose*, Norton/Worldwatch, 1983.
- (2) Humanistic psychology and other 'new age' thinking about personal growth emphasises the importance of unblocking people's psychic energies and releasing them into creative channels. See, for example, the index references to 'energies' in Roberto Assagioli's *Psychosynthesis*, Turnstone, 1975.
- (3) Further reading on technology 'as if people matter' is in E.F. Schumacher's *Good Work*, Cape, 1979; and George McRobie's *Small Is Possible*, Cape, 1981.
- (4) Marion Shoard, *The Theft of the Countryside*, Temple Smith, 1980.
- (5) *The Global 2000 Report to the President: Entering the 21st Century*, Penguin, 1982, concluded that "if present trends continue, the world in 2000 will be more crowded, more polluted, less stable ecologically, and more vulnerable to disruption than the world we live in now", and that "prompt and vigorous changes in public policy are needed to avoid or minimise these problems before they become unmanageable".
- (6) The Town and Country Planning Association (17 Carlton House Terrace, London SW1Y 5AS) and its journal, *Town and Country Planning*, are a valuable source of information and ideas. So are John Turner, author of *Housing by People*, Marion Boyars, 1976, and his colleagues at AHAS (PO Box 397, London E8 1BA). Also see John Adams' *Transport Planning: Vision and Practice*, RKP, 1981.
- (7) Leisure studies, including academic research and business consultancy, have mushroomed in recent years. See, for example, Stanley Parker's *Leisure and Work*, Allen and Unwin, 1983. I have learned much from W.H. Martin and S. Mason, whose *Leisure and Work: The Choices for 1991 and 2001*, Leisure Consultants, 1982, provides a good overview for readers from businesses and other organisations.